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Abstract
A complete and decidable Hoare-style calculus for iteration-free probabilistic sequential programs is presented using a state
logic with truth-functional propositional (not arithmetical) connectives.
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1. Introduction
Reasoning about probabilistic systems is very important due to applications in randomized algorithms, security,
reliability, distributed systems and, more recently, quantum computation and information. Logics supporting such
reasoning have branched in two main directions. Firstly, Hoare-style [31,25,10] and dynamic logics [13,21] have
been developed building upon denotational semantics of probabilistic programs [20]. The second approach enriches
temporal modalities with probabilistic bounds [14,17,27].
Our work is in the area of Hoare-style reasoning about probabilistic sequential programs. A Hoare assertion [15] is
a triple of the form {η1} s {η2} meaning that: if program s starts in a state satisfying the state assertion formula η1, and
if s halts, then s ends in a state satisfying the state transition formula η2. Formula η1 is known as the pre-condition
and formula η2 as the post-condition of the Hoare assertion. For probabilistic programs, the development of Hoare
logic has taken primarily two distinct paths. The common denominator of the two approaches is forward denotational
semantics of sequential probabilistic programs [20]: program states are (sub)-probability measures over valuations of
memory cells and denotations of programs are (sub)-probability transformations.
The first sound Hoare logic for probabilistic programs was given in [31] using a truth-functional state assertion
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language, i.e., the formulas of the logic are interpreted as either true or false, and the truth value of a formula is
determined by the truth values of the sub-formulas. This state assertion language consists of two levels: (i) classical
state formulas γ interpreted over the valuations of memory cells; (ii) probabilistic state formulas η interpreted over
(sub)-probability measures of the valuations. The latter contains terms of the form (
∫
γ ) representing the probability
of γ being true. But the language at the probabilistic level is extremely restrictive, and it is built from term equality
using conjunction. Furthermore, the Hoare rule for the alternative if–then–else is incomplete and even simple valid
assertions may not be provable. The reason for incompleteness of the Hoare rule for the alternative composition
in [31], as observed in [31,21], is that the Hoare rule tries to combine absolute information of the two alternates
truth-functionally to get absolute information of the alternative composition. This fails because the effects of the two
alternatives are not independent.
In order to avoid this problem, a probabilistic dynamic logic is given in [21] with an arithmetical state assertion
logic: the state formulas are interpreted as measurable functions and the connectives are arithmetical operations such
as addition and subtraction. Inspired by the dynamic logic in [21], there are several important works in the probabilistic
Hoare logic, e.g. [18,25], where the state formulas are either measurable functions or arithmetical formulas interpreted
as measurable functions. Intuitively, the Hoare triple { f } s {g} means that the expected value of the function g after
the execution of s is at least as high as the expected value of the function f before the execution.
Although research in probabilistic Hoare logic with arithmetical state logics has yielded several interesting results,
the Hoare triples themselves do not seem very intuitive. A high degree of sophistication is required to write down the
Hoare assertions needed to verify relatively simple programs. For this reason, it is worthwhile to investigate Hoare
logics with truth-functional state logics.
A sound Hoare logic with a truth-functional state logic was presented in [10], and completeness for a fragment of
the Hoare logic was shown for iteration-free programs. In order to deal with alternative composition, a test construct
bm?η and a probabilistic sum construct (η1+ η2) was introduced. Intuitively, the formula γ ? η is satisfied by a (sub)-
probability measure µ on valuations over the memory cell if µ(v) is non-zero only when the valuation v satisfies
γ and there is a valuation µ′ such that µ + µ′ satisfies η. The formula (η1 + η2) is satisfied by a (sub)-probability
measure µ if µ can be written as the sum of two measures µ1 and µ2 that satisfy η1 and η2 respectively. The drawback
of [10] is that no axiomatization is given for the state assertion logic. The choice construct and the probabilistic sum
constructs are the essential obstacles in achieving a complete axiomatization for the state language.
The gap between [31] and [10] was addressed in [8], which provides a sound Hoare logic with a complete and
decidable state assertion logic. The Hoare rule for an alternative construct is tackled using two key ingredients. First,
the usual if–then–else construct is slightly modified: a boolean memory variable bm is marked with the choice taken
at the end of the conditional branch. This modification gives a handle on the Hoare rule for the alternative construct
as all the choices are marked by the appropriate memory variable and thus become independent. Secondly, the state
assertion language has a conditional construct (η/γ ). Intuitively, the formula (η/γ ) is satisfied by a (sub)-probability
measureµ if η is true of the (sub)-probability measure obtained by eliminating the measure of all valuations where γ is
false. The conditional formulas (η/bm) and (η/(¬bm)) in the state logic can then be used to combine information of
the alternative paths. Another feature of the state language in [8] is that a distinction is maintained between possibility
and probability, yielding a more expressive state language. The completeness of the Hoare logic was left as an open
question.
This paper addresses the gap between [31] and [10,8], providing a complete and decidable Hoare logic for iteration-
free probabilistic programs using a complete and decidable truth-functional probabilistic state assertion logic. The
Hoare calculus provided herein was arrived at while attempting to prove the completeness of the Hoare logic proposed
in [8].
Our probabilistic state assertion logic, henceforth referred to as Exogenous Probabilistic Propositional Logic
(EPPL), is essentially the logic of [11], designed by taking the exogenous semantics approach [11,1,24] to enriching a
given logic — the models of the enriched logic are sets of models of the given logic with some additional structure. A
semantic model of EPPL is a discrete (sub)-probability space that gives the probability of each possible valuation. For
the sake of convenience, we work with finitely additive, discrete and bounded measures and not just (sub)-probability
measures. In order to achieve a recursive axiomatization for EPPL, it is also convenient to assume that the measures
take values from an arbitrary real closed field instead of the set of real numbers. The first-order theory of such fields is
decidable [16,4], and this technique of achieving decidability is detailed in other works on probabilistic reasoning
[11,1]. The exogenous approach to probabilistic logics first appeared in [28,29] and later in [11,1]. The general
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exogenous mechanism for building new logics is described in detail in [24,6] and used for developing quantum logics
in [23,7].
As in [31], there are two levels of formulas in EPPL: classical state formulas γ , interpreted over individual
valuations, and probabilistic state formulas η, interpreted over the models of EPPL. Terms p in the language at the
probabilistic level represent elements of a real closed field and the probability of γ being true is represented by the
term (
∫
γ ). Probabilistic state formulas are built from probabilistic atoms p1 ≤ p2, meaning that the term p1 is less
than or equal to the term p2, using the disjunctive connectives fff and ⊃.
The essential difference from our state assertion logic and the logic in [11] is that our terms p contain variables that
are interpreted over elements in the real closed field. In order to interpret these variables, our semantic structures also
contain an assignment. We do not allow quantification over these variables, allowing us to maintain the propositional
nature of the state assertion language. The other advantage is that the complexity of the known decision procedures
of quantifier-free formulas interpreted over real closed fields is simpler than the complexity of the known decision
procedures of the full first-order language [16,4]. As we shall see, variables are crucial in the proof of completeness
of the Hoare logic. They are used in the Hoare logic to keep track of individual contributions of the alternate choices
to the measure terms (
∫
γ ). A second difference is that we also allow products in terms. The logic in [11] does not
have general product terms and allows only products with constants, mainly for complexity considerations.
The programming language we consider is a basic imperative language with assignment to memory variables,
sequential composition, probabilistic assignment and alternative choice. The probabilistic assignment toss(bm, r)
assigns bm to true with probability r . The term r is a constant and does not depend on the state of the program. This
is not a serious restriction; for instance, r is taken to be 12 in probabilistic Turing machines. The alternative choice
construct described here is the standard if–then–else construct and not the modified marked if–then–else proposed
in [8]. It turns out that the variables in the state language are sufficient to keep track of individual contributions of the
alternate choices and it is not necessary to mark the choices explicitly to achieve completeness. Another difference
between our work and the work in [8] is that is that we do not distinguish between possibility and probability. This
is in accordance with standard works on probabilistic programs, and it simplifies the proof of completeness of Hoare
logic. The obvious disadvantage of this decision is that we lose expressiveness.
The completeness and decidability of the proposed Hoare calculus for reasoning about iteration-free probabilistic
programs is achieved using the standard technique. First, we define a weakest precondition operator wp(·, ·) assigning
to each program s and each formula η a new state formula wp(s, η) corresponding to the weakest logical property that
a state must satisfy to ensure that η holds after execution of s. The weakest precondition operator is defined in terms
of an auxiliary preterm operator pt(·, ·) assigning to each program s and each formula p a new state formula pt(s, p)
such that the denotation of pt(s, p) before execution of s is the same as the denotation of p after the execution of p
regardless of initial state. The weakest preconditionwp(s, η) is then built by replacing each term p in η by the preterm
pt(s, p).
We then show that, for any program s and formula η, the Hoare calculus derives the judgment {wp(s, η)} s {η};
in other words, wp(s, η) is a sufficient precondition for s and η. The proof of completeness concludes after showing
that (V,K, µ)ρ  wp(s, η) iff [[s]](V,K, µ)ρ  η. The decidability of EPPL combined with the fact that weakest
precondition can be built algorithmically gives decidability of the Hoare logic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The syntax, semantics and the complete recursive axiomatization of
EPPL are presented in Section 2. The programming language is introduced in Section 3 and the sound Hoare logic
in Section 4. The proofs of completeness and decidability of the Hoare calculus are given in Section 6. We finish by
presenting two examples illustrating the Hoare calculus and the generated weakest pre-conditions in Section 7. We
discuss related work in Section 8 and summarize the results and future work in Section 9.
2. Logic of probabilistic states: EPPL
The state logic presented herein is the probability logic proposed in [11] extended with variables that assist in the
proof of completeness of the Hoare calculus. In our probabilistic programs, we work with a finite number of memory
cells of two kinds: registers containing real values (with a finite range D fixed once and for all) and registers containing
boolean values. In addition to reflecting the usual implementation of real numbers as floating-point numbers, the
restriction that real registers take values from a finite range D is also needed for completeness results. Note that,
instead of reals, we could have also used any type with finite range.
R. Chadha et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 379 (2007) 142–165 145
Any run of a program probabilistically assigns values to these registers. Such an assignment is henceforth called a
valuation. If we denote the set of valuations by V , then intuitively a semantic structure of EPPL is a finitely additive,
discrete and bounded measure µ on ℘V , the power-set of V; in other words, µ is a map from ℘V to R+ (the set of
non-negative real numbers) such that:
• µ(∅) = 0;
• µ(U1 ∪U2) = µ(U1)+ µ(U2) if U1 ∩U2 = ∅.
Loosely speaking, µ(U ) denotes the probability of a possible valuation being in the set U . A measure µ is said to be
a probability measure if µ(V) = 1. We work with general measures instead of probability measures as it makes the
semantics simpler.
Furthermore, it is convenient to assume that the measures take values from an arbitrary real closed field instead of
the set of real numbers. An ordered field K = (K ,+, . , 1, 0,≤) is said to be a real closed field if the following hold:
• every non-negative element of the K has a square root in K ;
• every polynomial of odd degree with coefficients in K has at least one solution.
Examples of real closed fields include the set of real numbers with the usual multiplication, addition and order relation.
Another example is the set of computable real numbers with the same operations. A measure that takes values from a
real closed field K will henceforth be called a K-measure.
Any real closed field has copies of the integers and the rationals. In addition, in a real closed field we can take roots
of positive elements and odd n-roots. In general, any real algebraic number is definable in a real closed field. The set
of real algebraic numbers shall be denoted by A; we shall use these numbers as constants in probability terms of our
logic.
A semantic structure of EPPL consists of a real closed fieldK and aK-measure on ℘V . We will call these semantic
structures generalized probabilistic structures.
We start by describing the syntax of the logic.
2.1. Language
The language of EPPL consists of formulas at two levels. The formulas of the first level – classical state formulas –
allow us to reason about individual valuations over the memory cells. The formulas of the second level – probabilistic
state formulas – allow us to reason about generalized probabilistic structures.
There are two kinds of terms in the language: real terms, used in classical state formulas to denote elements from
the set D, and probability terms, used in probabilistic state formulas to denote elements in an arbitrary real closed
field. The syntax of the language is given in Table 1 using the BNF notation and discussed below.
Table 1
Language of EPPL
Real terms (with the proviso c ∈ D)
t := xm 8 X 8 c 8 (t + t) 8 (t t)
Classical state formulas
γ := bm 8 B 8 (t ≤ t) 8 ff 8 (γ ⇒ γ )
Probability terms (with the proviso r ∈ A)
p := y 8 r 8 (∫ γ ) 8 (p + p) 8 (pp) 8 r˜
Probabilistic state formulae:
η := (p ≤ p) 8 fff 8 (η ⊃ η)
Given a fixed m = {0, . . . ,m − 1}, there are two finite disjoint sets of memory variables: xM = {xmk : k ∈ m},
representing the contents of real registers, and bM = {bmk : k ∈ m}, representing the contents of boolean registers.
We also have two sets of (rigid over time and random) logical variables which are useful in parametric reasoning
about programs: B = {Bk : k ∈ N}, ranging over the truth values in 2 = {ff, tt}, and X = {Xk : k ∈ N}, ranging
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over elements of D. At the end of Section 2.2 we will show that the special case in which these random variables
behave deterministically except on a set of measure zero can be expressed in the logic. Therefore, we can use these
variables as deterministic parameters in applications. On the other hand, the randomness of these variables allow us
to have random initial states, which is useful for compositional reasoning about programs; furthermore, it simplifies
the theory.
The real terms, ranged over by t, t1, . . . , are built from the sets D, xM and X using the usual addition and
multiplication.2 The classical state formulas, ranged over by γ, γ1, . . . , are built from bM, B and comparison formulas
(p1 ≤ p2) using the classical disjunctive connectives ff and⇒. As usual, other classical connectives (¬,∨,∧,⇔, tt)
are introduced as abbreviations. For instance, (¬ γ ) stands for (γ ⇒ ff).
The probability terms, ranged over by p, p1, . . . , denote elements of the real closed field in a semantic structure.
We also assume a set of (rigid and deterministic) logical variables, Y = {yk : k ∈ N}, ranging over elements of the
real closed field. These logical variables, which were not present in [11], are essential in our proof of completeness of
the Hoare logic.
The probability terms also contain real algebraic numbers as constants. The denotation of the probability term r˜ is
r if 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, 0 if r ≤ 0 and 1 otherwise. The probability term (∫ γ ) denotes the measure of the set of valuations that
satisfy γ . The terms of the kind (
∫
γ ) shall henceforth be called measure terms. We denote the set of all probability
terms by PTerms.
The probabilistic state formulas, ranged over by η, η1, . . . , are built from comparison formulas (p1 ≤ p2) using
the connectives fff and⊃. Other probabilistic connectives (	,∪,∩,≈, ttt) and comparison operators (=,≥, <,>) are
introduced as abbreviations in the classical way. For instance, (	 η) stands for (η ⊃ fff) and (p1 = p2) stands for
((p1 ≤ p2) ∩ (p2 ≤ p1)). We denote the set of all probabilistic state formulas by PForms.
It is also convenient for applications to introduce as an abbreviation the formula (γ ) which stands for the formula
((
∫
γ ) = (∫ tt)). Intuitively, γ is satisfied if the set of the valuations where γ does not hold has measure zero. We
shall also use (♦γ ) as an abbreviation for (	((¬ γ ))). Intuitively, (♦γ ) is satisfied if the set of valuations where γ
holds has non-zero measure. We shall see in Section 2.2 that  and ♦ behave somewhat as necessity and possibility
modalities. However,  and ♦ are not full fledged modalities, since they cannot be nested.3
The notion of occurrence of a term p and a probabilistic state formula η1 in the probabilistic state formula η
is defined as usual. The same holds for the notion of replacing zero or more occurrences of probability terms and
probabilistic formulas. The set of variables y ∈ Y occurring in a term p and a formula η will be denoted by PVar(p)
and PVar(η). For the sake of clarity, we shall often drop parentheses in formulas and terms if it does not lead to
ambiguity.
We shall also identify here a useful sub-language of probabilistic state formulas which do not contain any
occurrence of a measure term.
κ := (a ≤ a) 8 fff 8 (κ ⊃ κ)
a := x 8 r 8 (a + a) 8 (aa) 8 r˜
The terms of this sub-language will be called analytical terms and the formulas will be called analytical formulas.
2.2. Semantics
A valuation is a map v : (xM→ D,bM→ 2,X→ D,B→ 2) that provides values to the memory variables and
corresponding logical variables. The set of all possible valuations is denoted by V . Given a valuation v, the denotation
of real terms [[t]]v and satisfaction of classical state formulas vcγ are defined inductively as expected. Given V ⊆ V ,
the extent of γ in V is defined as |γ |V = {v ∈ V : v c γ }.
A generalized probabilistic state is a pair (K, µ) where K a real closed field and µ is a finitely additive, discrete
and finite K-measure over ℘V . The set of all generalized states is denoted by G.
Given a classical formula γ we also need the sub-measure of µ defined by
µγ = λV . µ(|γ |V ).
2 The arithmetical operations addition and multiplication are assumed to be defined so as to restrict them to the range D. This is satisfied if we
assume D to be closed under them.
3 We do not have formulas such as (γ ).
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Table 2
Semantics of EPPL
Denotation of probability terms
[[r ]]ρ
(K ,µ) = r
[[y]]ρ
(K ,µ) = ρ(y)
[[(∫ γ )]]ρ
(K ,µ) = µ(|γ |V )
[[p1 + p2]]ρ(K ,µ) = [[p1]]
ρ
(K ,µ) + [[p2]]
ρ
(K ,µ)
[[p1 p2]]ρ(K ,µ) = [[p1]]
ρ
(K ,µ) × [[p2]]
ρ
(K ,µ)
Satisfaction of probabilistic formulas
(K , µ)ρ  (p1 ≤ p2) iff ([[p1]]ρ(K ,µ) ≤ [[p2]]
ρ
(K ,µ))
(K , µ)ρ 6 fff
(K , µ)ρ  (η1 ⊃ η2) iff (K , µ)ρ  η2 or (K , µ)ρ 6 η1
Intuitively, µγ is null outside the extent of γ and coincides with µ inside it.
To interpret the probabilistic variables y ∈ Y, we need the concept of assignment. Given a real closed field K, a
K-assignment is a map ρ : Y→ K.
Given a generalized state (K , µ) and a K-assignment ρ, the denotation of probabilistic terms and satisfaction of
probabilistic state formulas are defined inductively in Table 2. The formula (p1 ≤ p2) is satisfied if the term denoted
by p1 is less than or equal to p2. The formula (η1 ⊃ η2) is satisfied by a semantic model if either η1 is not satisfied
by the model or η2 is satisfied by the model. Observe that the probabilistic connectives behave like the classical ones.
Also, the K-assignment ρ is sufficient to interpret an analytical formula, i.e., a probabilistic formula without measure
terms.
Entailment is defined as usual: Λ entails η (written Λ  η) if (K , µ)ρ  η whenever (K , µ)ρ  η0 for each
η0 ∈ Λ. The meta-theorem of entailment holds: Λ, η  η′ iff Λ  (η ⊃ η′).
We can also define the probabilistic sum construct similar to the one defined in [10] by saying that (K , µ)ρ 
η1 + η2 if there exist µ1 and µ2 such that µ = µ1 + µ2, (K, µ1)ρ  η1 and (K, µ1)ρ  η2. However, as already
observed in Section 1, it is not obvious how to axiomatize this construction.
Recall the derived formula (γ ) defined above. Clearly, (K, µ)ρ  (γ ) iff µ(|γ |V ) = µ(V) iff µ(| ¬ γ |V ) = 0.
Similarly, (K, µ)ρ  (♦γ ) iff µ(|γ |V ) > 0.
It follows easily from the semantics that  ((γ1 ∧ γ2)) ≈ ((γ1) ∩ (γ2)). Hence, (γ ) behaves as necessity
modality. Similarly, (♦γ ) behaves as possibility modality, i.e.,  (♦(γ1 ∨ γ2)) ≈ ((♦γ1) ∪ (♦γ2)). However, it is not
the case that  ((γ ) ⊃ (♦γ )). Consider a generalized probabilistic state (K, µ) where µ is identically zero; then
(K, µ)  γ for all classical state formulas γ , but (K, µ)  ♦γ holds for none of them.
Returning to the random nature of our logical variables in X and B, observe that we can impose that they behave
deterministically except with zero probability. For instance, the formula
⋃
c∈D((Xk = c)) constrains Xk to have a
fixed value except with measure zero. Clearly, this is possible because both our data types are finite.
2.3. The axiomatization
We need three new concepts for the axiomatization: that of valid state formula, that of probabilistic tautology and
that of valid analytical formula.
A classical state formula γ is said to be valid if it holds for all valuations v ∈ V . As a consequence of the finiteness
of D, the set of valid classical state formulas is recursive.
Consider propositional formulas built from a countable set of propositional symbols Q using the classical
connectives ⊥ and→. A probabilistic formula η is said to be a probabilistic tautology if there exist a propositional
tautology β over Q and a map σ from Q to the set of probabilistic state formulas such that η coincides with βpσ , where
βpσ is the probabilistic formula obtained from β by replacing all occurrences of ⊥ by fff,→ by ⊃ and q ∈ Q by
σ(q). For instance, the probabilistic formula ((y1 ≤ y2)⊃ (y1 ≤ y2)) is tautological (obtained from the propositional
tautology q → q).
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Table 3
Axioms for EPPL
Axioms
[CTaut] ` (γ ) for each valid state formula γ
[PTaut] ` η for each probabilistic tautology η
[RCF] ` κ EyEp for any valid analytical formula κ and sequences of
probability variables and probability terms Ey and Ep,
respectively
[Meas∅] ` ((∫ ff) = 0)
[FAdd] ` (((∫(γ1 ∧ γ2)) = 0)⊃ ((∫(γ1 ∨ γ2)) = (∫ γ1)+ (∫ γ2)))
[Mon] ` (((γ1⇒ γ2))⊃ ((
∫
γ1) ≤ (
∫
γ2)))
Inference rule
[PMP] η1, (η1 ⊃ η2) ` η2
As noted in Section 2.2, if K0 is the real closed field in a generalized probabilistic structure, then a K0-assignment
is enough to interpret all analytical formulas. We say that κ is a valid analytical formula if κ is satisfied by ρ for any
real closed field K and any K-assignment ρ. Clearly, a valid analytical formula holds in all semantic structures of
EPPL. It is a well-known fact from the theory of quantifier elimination [16,4] that the set of valid analytical formulas
so defined is decidable. We shall not go into details of this result as we want to focus on reasoning about probabilistic
aspects only.
The axioms and inference rules of EPPL are listed in Table 3 and better understood in the following groups.
Axiom CTaut says that if γ is a valid classical state formula then (γ ) is an axiom. Axiom PTaut says that a
probabilistic tautology is an axiom. Since the set of valid classical state formulas and the set of probabilistic tautologies
are both recursive, there is no need to spell out the details of tautological reasoning.
The term κ EyEp in axiom RCF is the term obtained by substituting all occurrences of yi in κ by the probability term
pi . Axiom RCF says that if κ is a valid analytical formula, then any formula obtained by replacing variables by
probability terms is a tautology. Again, we refrain from spelling out the details as the set of valid analytical formulas
is recursive.
Axiom Meas∅ states simply that the measure of the empty set is 0, while axiom FAdd expresses finite additivity
of measures. Finally, axiomMon relates the classical connectives with probability measures and is a consequence of
monotonicity of measures.
The inference rule PMP is the modus ponens for classical and probabilistic implication.
As usual we say that a set of formulas Λ derives η, written Λ ` η, if we can build a derivation of η from axioms
and the inference rules using formulas in Λ as hypotheses. It can be easily shown that the meta-theorem of deduction
holds, that is, Λ, η1 ` η2 iff Λ ` (η1 ⊃ η2).
Throughout this paper, we shall only be concerned with judgments of the form Λ ` η where Λ is a finite set. Since
both meta-theorems of entailment and deduction hold in EPPL, it suffices to consider judgments where Λ is empty.
The soundness of the axiom system is a consequence of the definition.
Theorem 2.1. The axiom system of EPPL is sound, i.e., if ` η then  η.
Proof. The validity of the axioms and the inference rule PMP follow from the definition of the semantics. 
The proofs of completeness and decidability of EPPL go hand-in-hand and essentially follow the lines of the
proof of completeness in [11,24]. The main ingredient is the model existence lemma: if a probabilistic formula η
is consistent, i.e. 6` (	 η), then there is a model that satisfies η. Furthermore, there is an algorithm that decides the
consistency of a probabilistic formula. We give a sketch of the proof and refer the reader to [11] for details.
Theorem 2.2. The proof system of EPPL is weakly complete, i.e., if  η then ` η. Moreover, the set of theorems of
EPPL is recursive.
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Proof sketch. The central result is to show that if η is consistent (that is, 6` (	 η)) then there is a model (K, µ)ρ such
that (K, µ)ρ  η. The decidability follows by showing that the consistency of a formula is decidable.
The proof in [11,24] adapted to EPPL is summarized as follows: (i) compute the (finite) set of valuations over the
memory cells and the logical variables in the sets B and X occurring in η and let this set of valuations be V ; (ii) let
κ1 be the analytical formula obtained from η by effectively replacing measure terms (
∫
γ ) by sums
∑
vcγ,v∈V yv
where yv represents the probability of the valuation v; (iii) let κ be the analytical formula
⋂
yvv∈V (0 ≤ yv); (iv) η
is consistent iff κ is; (v) finally, consistency of κ is decided by the axiom RCF and the model is constructed for a
consistent κ by solving for yv in real closed fields. 
As there are algorithms for deciding the consistency of analytical formulas, the best-known of which are described
in [4], we can get an idea of the complexity of the SAT procedure proposed above. The best algorithm is exponential
in the number of variables. This construction generates a variable yv for each valuation v, hence the total number
of variables will be exponential on the number of propositional symbols (since there is an exponential number of
valuations). Hence, the algorithm will be doubly exponential on the number of propositional symbols and exponential
on the number of EPPL variables in a given formula.
3. Basic probabilistic sequential programs
We now describe the syntax and semantics of our programming language.
3.1. Syntax
Assuming the syntax of EPPL, the syntax of the programming language in the BNF notation is as follows (with the
proviso r ∈ R).
s := skip 8 xm← t 8 bm← γ 8 toss(bm, r) 8 s; s 8 if γ then s else s
The statement skip does nothing. The statement xm← t assigns to the memory cell xm the value denoted by t ,
and the statement bm← γ assigns to the cell bm the truth value of γ . For the rest of the paper, by expression we shall
mean either a term t or a classical state formula γ . Note that both t and γ may contain variables in the set X (which
may be thought of as input to a program).
The statement toss(bm, r) sets bm to true with probability r˜ . Sequential composition of commands is written s; s.
The statement if γ then s1 else s2 is an alternative choice: if γ is true then s1 is executed, else s2 is executed.
Bounded iteration may be introduced as an abbreviation. Given k ∈ N, one may define (whilek γ do s) as
(if γ then s else skip)k .
3.2. Semantics
The semantics of the programming language is basically the forward semantics in [21] adapted to our programming
language. Given G, the set of generalized probabilistic states, the denotation of a program s is a map [[s]] : G → G
defined inductively in Table 4. The definition uses the following notations.
• The denotation of a real term t given a valuation v can be extended to classical state formulas as [[γ ]]v = tt if vcγ
and [[γ ]]v = ff otherwise.• If m is a memory cell (xm or bm) and e is an expression of the same type (t or γ , respectively), then the map
δme : V → V is defined as δme (v) = vm[[e]]v where vm[[e]]v assigns the value [[e]]v to the cell m and coincides with v
elsewhere. As usual, (δme )
−1 : ℘V → ℘V is defined by taking each set U ⊂ V to the set of its pre-images.
• (K, µ1)+ (K, µ2) = (K, µ1 + µ2).
• r(K, µ) = (K, rµ).
The denotation of classical assignments and sequential composition are as expected. The probabilistic toss
toss(bm, r,) assigns to bm the value tt with probability r˜ and the value ff with probability 1 − r˜ ; therefore, the
denotation of the probabilistic toss is the “weighted” sum of the two assignments bm ← tt and bm ← ff. The
denotation of the alternative composition is as expected: s1 is executed in the states where γ is true and s2 is executed
in the states where γ is false. It can be easily shown that any probabilistic program preserves the total measure, i.e., if
[[s]](K, µ) = (K′, µ′) then µ(V) = µ′(V).
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Table 4
Denotation of programs
[[skip]] = λ(K, µ). (K, µ)
[[xm← t]] = λ(K, µ). (K, µ ◦ (δxmt )−1)
[[bm← γ ]] = λ(K, µ). (K, µ ◦ (δbmγ )−1)
[[toss(bm, r)]] = λ(K, µ). ( r˜ ([[bm← tt]](K, µ))+ (1− r˜ ) ([[bm← ff]](K, µ)))
[[s1; s2]] = λ(K, µ). [[s2]] ([[s1]](K, µ))
[[if γ then s1 else s2]] = λ(K, µ). ( [[s1]](K, µγ )+ [[s2]](K, µ(¬ γ )))
Table 5
Tossed terms and formulas
Tossed terms
toss(bm, r; r ′) = r ′
toss(bm, r; y) = y
toss(bm, r; (∫ γ )) = ( r˜(∫ γ bmtt )+ (1− r˜ )(∫ γ bmff ))
toss(bm, r; (p + p′)) = (toss(bm, r; p)+ toss(bm, r; p′))
toss(bm, r; (pp′)) = (toss(bm, r; p) toss(bm, r; p′))
Tossed formulas
toss(bm, r; fff) = fff
toss(bm, r; (p ≤ p′)) = (toss(bm, r; p) ≤ toss(bm, r; p′))
toss(bm, r; (η ⊃ η′)) = (toss(bm, r; η)⊃ toss(bm, r; η′))
4. Probabilistic Hoare logic
We are ready to define the Hoare logic. As usual, Hoare assertions are
Ψ := η 8 {η} s {η}.
Satisfaction of Hoare assertions is defined as follows.
• (K, µ)ρ h η if (K, µ)ρ  η;
• (K, µ)ρ h {η1} s {η2} if (K, µ)ρ  η2 whenever [[s]](K, µ)ρ  η1.
We say that a Hoare assertion Ψ is semantically valid, and write  Ψ , if (K, µ)ρ h Ψ for every generalized
probabilistic state (K, µ) and any K-assignment ρ.
4.1. Calculus
We shall now give a sound and complete axiomatization of the Hoare calculus. We will only consider judgments
of the form ` Ψ , i.e., judgments with no hypotheses. Hence, in all inference rules the premises are assumed to be
theorems of the Hoare calculus. We need some new concepts for the axiomatization: tossed terms, tossed formulas,
conditional terms and conditional formulas.
Given a memory cell bm, a constant r ∈ A and a probabilistic term p ∈ PTerms, we define the (bm, r)-tossed
term toss(bm, r; p) to be the term obtained from p by replacing every occurrence of each measure term (∫ γ ) by
r˜(
∫
γ bmtt ) + (1 − r˜ )(
∫
γ bmff ), where the formula γ
bm
e is obtained from γ by replacing all occurrences of bm by e.
Similarly, we define the probabilistic formula toss(bm, r; η) to be the formula obtained from η by replacing every
occurrence of each measure term (
∫
γ ) by r˜(
∫
γ bmtt ) + (1 − r˜ )(
∫
γ bmff ). Formally, toss(bm, r; ·) can be defined
recursively on the set of probabilistic terms PTerms and the set of probabilistic formulas PForms. The recursive
definition is given in Table 5. Note that this recursive definition also gives a recursive algorithm for computing
toss(bm, r; p) and toss(bm, r; η).
R. Chadha et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 379 (2007) 142–165 151
Table 6
Conditional terms and formulas
Conditional terms Conditional formulas
r/γ = r
y/γ = y
(
∫
γ ′)/γ = (
∫
(γ ∧ γ ′))
(p + p′)/γ = (p/γ + p′/γ )
(pp′)/γ = ((p/γ ) (p′/γ ))
fff/γ = fff
(p ≤ p′)/γ = (p/γ ≤ p′/γ )
(η ⊃ η′)/γ = (η/γ ⊃ η′/γ )
Table 7
Hoare calculus
Axioms
[TAUT] ` η if η is an EPPL theorem
[
∫
FREE] ` {κ} s {κ} if κ is an analytical formula
[SKIP] ` {η} skip {η}
[ASGR] ` {ηxmt } xm← t {η}
[ASGB] ` {ηbmγ }bm← γ {η}
[TOSS] ` {toss(bm, η; r)} toss(bm, r) {η}
Inference rules
[SEQ] {η0} s1 {η1}, {η1} s2 {η2} ` {η0} s1; s2 {η2}
[IF] {η1} s1 {y1 = (
∫
γ0)}, {η2} s2 {y2 = (
∫
γ0)} ` {η1 gγ η2} if γ then s1 else s2{y1 + y2 = (
∫
γ0)}
[ELIMV] {η ∩ (y = p)} s {η} ` {ηyp} s {η} if y 6∈ PVar(p) ∪ PVar(η)
[CONS] η0 ⊃ η1, {η1} s {η2}, η2 ⊃ η3 ` {η0} s {η3}
[OR] {η0} s {η2}, {η1} s {η2} ` {η0 ∪ η1} s {η2}
[AND] {η0} s {η1}, {η0} s {η2} ` {η0} s {η1 ∩ η2}
Given a classical state formula γ and a probabilistic term p ∈ PTerms, we define the γ -conditioned term (p/γ ) to
be the term obtained from p by replacing every occurrence of each measure term (
∫
γ ′) by (
∫
(γ ′ ∧ γ )). Similarly, we
define the probabilistic formula η/γ to be the formula obtained from η by replacing every occurrence of eachmeasure
term (
∫
γ ′) by (
∫
(γ ′ ∧ γ )). The recursive definition of (·)/γ is given in Table 6. Again, this recursive definition gives
a recursive algorithm for computing p/γ and η/γ . Given two probabilistic formulas η1 and η2, we shall use (η1gγ η2)
as an abbreviation for ((η1/γ ) ∩ (η2/(¬ γ ))).
A sound and complete Hoare calculus for our probabilistic sequential programs is given in Table 7. The axioms
TAUT and SKIP and the inference rules SEQ,CONS,OR andAND are similar to the ones in the case of deterministic
sequential programs. The others are briefly discussed below.
Recall that an analytical formula is a probabilistic formula that does not contain any measure terms (terms of the
kind (
∫
γ )). Since an analytical formula does not contain any memory cells, a execution of a program does not change
the truth value of an analytical formula κ . This fact is reflected in the axiom
∫
FREE. (Actually, this axiom is only
needed if s is an alternative statement. It can be derived in other cases by induction.)
In the axioms ASGR and ASGB, the notation ηme stands for the formula obtained from η by replacing all
occurrences of the memory variable m by the expression e. The axioms ASGR and ASGB are analogous to the
Hoare rules for assignment in the case of deterministic sequential programs. The axiom TOSS covers the case of
probabilistic tosses.
For the inference rule IF, recall that η1 gγ0 η2 is an abbreviation for the formula ((η1/γ0) ∩ (η2/(¬ γ0))). This
inference rule keeps track of (
∫
γ ), the measure of γ . The variables y1 and y2 account for the contributions to (
∫
γ )
from the alternative branches s1 and s2, respectively. Although this rule might seem a bit restrictive, it is sufficient to
guarantee the completeness of the Hoare calculus along with the axiom
∫
FREE and the inference rule ELIMV.
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The inference rule ELIMV eliminates variables in the set Y. In this rule, η cannot have any conditional constructs
and the variable y does not occur in either the probabilistic term p or the post-condition η. This inference rule is
essential for proving the completeness of Hoare logic and is not present in [8]. It can be viewed as a special case of
the inference rule for existential quantifiers in first-order Hoare logic, which is often stated as
{ϕ} s {ψ} ` {(∃z. ϕ)} s {ψ} if z does not occur in ψ .
The inference rule ELIMV can then be viewed as a special instance of this rule by observing that the first-order
formula (∃z. (ϕ(z)∧ (z = r))) is equivalent to (∃z. (ϕ(r)∧ (z = r))), which in turn is equivalent to ϕ(r) if z does not
occur in r .
5. Soundness of the Hoare logic
We now show that the Hoare calculus presented in Section 4 is sound, i.e., if ` Ψ then h Ψ . It is sufficient to
show that all the axioms and inference rules of the Hoare calculus are sound.
The proofs of soundness of the axioms ASGB and ASGR rely on the substitution lemma for classical valuations.
This situation is similar to the one in deterministic sequential programs, where the key ingredient for the soundness
of the axiom for assignments is also a substitution lemma. Recall that the valuation vm[[e]]v assigns the value [[e]]v to the
cell m and coincides with the valuation v elsewhere.
Lemma 5.1 (Substitution Lemma for Classical Valuations). For every valuation v ∈ V , classical state formula γ ,
memory cell m (xm or bm) and term e of the same type (t or γ ′, respectively),
vm[[e]]v c γ iff v c γ
m
e .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of γ and is similar to the one for deterministic sequential
programs. 
We now extend the substitution lemma for classical valuations to a substitution lemma for probabilistic terms and
formulas, which will imply the soundness of ASGB and ASGR. Recall that δme : V → V is the map that takes each
valuation v to vm[[e]]v .
Lemma 5.2 (Substitution Lemma for Assignment). Let (K, µ) be a generalized probabilistic structure and ρ be a
K-assignment. Given a memory cell m and a term e of the same type, let µ′ = µ ◦ (δme )−1. Then[[(∫
γ
)]]ρ
(K,µ′)
=
[[(∫
γme
)]]ρ
(K,µ)
for any classical state formula γ . Furthermore, for any probabilistic term p,
[[p]]ρ
(K,µ′) = [[pme ]]ρ(K,µ),
and, for any probabilistic formula η,
(K, µ′)ρ  η iff (K, µ)ρ  ηme .
Proof. As a consequence of Lemma 5.1,
(δme )
−1(|γ |V ) = |γme |V and hence µ((δme )−1(|γ |V )) = µ(|γme |V ).
Therefore, by definition,[[(∫
γ
)]]ρ
(K,µ′)
= µ ◦ (δme )−1(|γ |V ) = µ(|γme |V ) =
[[(∫
γme
)]]ρ
(K,µ)
.
The result is extended to probabilistic terms and formulas by induction. 
The soundness of the axiom for probabilistic toss, TOSS, is an easy consequence of the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.3 (Substitution Lemma for Probabilistic Tosses). Let (K , µ) be a generalized probabilistic structure, ρ be
a K-assignment, r ∈ A be a constant and µ′ = r˜ µ ◦ (δbmtt )−1 + (1 − r˜ ) µ ◦ (δbmff )−1. Then, for any classical state
formula γ ,[[(∫
γ
)]]ρ
(K,µ′)
= r˜
[[(∫
γ bmtt
)]]ρ
(K ,µ)
+ (1− r˜ )
[[(∫
γ bmff
)]]ρ
(K ,µ)
.
Furthermore, for any probabilistic term p,
[[p]]ρ
(K,µ′) = [[toss(bm, r; p)]]ρ(K ,µ),
and, for any probabilistic formula η,
(K, µ′)ρ  η iff (K , µ)ρ  toss(bm, r; η).
Proof. Let µ1 = µ ◦ (δbmtt )−1 and µ2 = µ ◦ (δbmff )−1. Then[[(∫
γ
)]]ρ
(K,µ′)
= r˜
[[(∫
γ
)]]ρ
(K,µ1)
+ (1− r˜ )
[[(∫
γ
)]]ρ
(K,µ2)
by definition; by Lemma 5.2[[(∫
γ
)]]ρ
(K,µ1)
=
[[(∫
γ bmtt
)]]ρ
(K ,µ)
and
[[(∫
γ
)]]ρ
(K,µ2)
=
[[(∫
γ bmff
)]]ρ
(K ,µ)
.
The claim for probabilistic terms and probabilistic formulas then follows by induction. 
The following proposition asserts the soundness of the axiom
∫
FREE.
Proposition 5.4 (Soundness of
∫
FREE). For any statement s, any analytical formula κ , any generalized state
(K, µ) and K assignment ρ,
([[s]](K, µ))ρ  κ iff (K, µ)ρ  κ.
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that interpretation of analytical depends only on the assignment ρ. 
Proposition 5.5. For any generalized state (K, µ), K-assignment ρ and classical state formulas γ and γ ′,[[(∫
γ ′
)/
γ
]]ρ
(K,µ)
=
[[(∫
γ ′
)]]ρ
(K,µγ )
.
Furthermore, for any probability term p,
[[p/γ ]]ρ
(K,µ) = [[p]]ρ(K,µγ ),
and, for any probabilistic formula η,
(K, µ)ρ  η/γ iff (K, µγ )ρ  η.
Proof. By definition,[[(∫
γ ′
)]]ρ
(K,µγ )
= µγ (|γ ′|V ) = µ(|γ ′|V ∩ |γ |V ) = µ(|γ ′ ∧ γ |V ) =
[[(∫
γ ′
)/
γ
]]ρ
(K,µ)
.
The claims for probabilistic terms and formulas now follow by induction. 
We can now establish the soundness of the inference rule IF.
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Lemma 5.6 (Soundness of IF). Given probabilistic state formulas η1 and η2, programs s1 and s2, variables y1 ∈ Y
and y2 ∈ Y and a classical state formula γ ,
h {η1} s1
{
y1 =
(∫
γ
)}
and h {η2} s2
{
y2 =
(∫
γ
)}
iff, for any classical state formula γ0,
h {η1gγ0η2} if γ0 then s1 else s2
{
y1 + y2 =
(∫
γ
)}
.
Proof. Let (K, µ) be a generalized probabilistic state and ρ be a K-assignment such that (K, µ)ρ  η1gγ0η2. Then
(K, µ)ρ  η1/γ0 and (K, µ)ρ  η2/(¬ γ0). Thus, (K, µγ0)ρ  η1 and (K, µ(¬ γ0))ρ  η2 by Proposition 5.5.
Let (K, µ1) = [[s1]](K, µγ0), (K, µ2) = [[s2]](K, µ(¬ γ0)) and µ′ = µ1 + µ2. We need to show that (K, µ′)ρ 
(y1 + y2 = (
∫
γ )).
Since h {η1} s1 {y1 = (
∫
γ )} and (K, µγ0)ρ  η1, it follows that (K, µ1) h y1 = (
∫
γ ). Thus, by definition
ρ(y1) = µ1(|γ |V ). Similarly, ρ(y2) = µ2(|γ |V ).
Hence, µ′(|γ |V ) = µ1(|γ |V )+µ2(|γ |V ) = ρ(y1)+ρ(y2) = ρ(y1+ y2). Therefore, (K, µ′)ρ  (y1+ y2 = (
∫
γ ))
as required. 
We now show that the inference rule ELIMV is sound. In order to do this, we shall first establish a substitution
result for variables y ∈ Y. For the rest of the paper, given a K-assignment ρ, a variable y ∈ Y and an element k ∈ K,
the K-assignment ρ yk denotes the assignment that assigns the value k to y and coincides with ρ elsewhere.
Proposition 5.7. Let y ∈ Y be a variable and p be a probabilistic term. Given a general probabilistic structure (K, µ)
and a K-assignment ρ, let k = [[p]]ρ
(K,µ) and ρ1 = ρ yk . Then:
• for any probabilistic term p0, [[p0]]ρ1(K,µ) = [[p0yp]]
ρ
(K,µ);
• for any probabilistic formula η, (K, µ)ρ1  η iff (K, µ)ρ  ηyp.
Proof. The first part of the proposition is proved by induction on the structure of p0. We consider the case when p0
is a variable y0, the other cases being straightforward. If y0 is y, then by definition [[y]]ρ1(K,µ) = k = [[p]]ρ(K,µ) =
[[yyp]]ρ(K,µ). Otherwise, [[y0]]ρ1(K,µ) = ρ1(y0) = ρ(y0) = [[y0]]ρ(K,µ) = [[y0yp]]
ρ
(K,µ).
The second part of the proposition follows by induction. 
We make one more observation before we prove the soundness of ELIMV. Let y ∈ Y be a variable and η be a
probabilistic formula such that η does not contain any occurrence of y. For any general probabilistic structure (K, µ)
and K-assignments ρ1 and ρ2 such that ρ1(y′) = ρ2(y′) for any y′ distinct from y, a straightforward induction shows
that
(K, µ)ρ1  η iff (K, µ)ρ2  η.
Lemma 5.8 (Soundness of ELIMV). Given a probabilistic formula η, a probabilistic term p, a probabilistic formula
η, a variable y ∈ Y that does not occur either in p or in η and a statement s,
if h {η ∩ (y = p)} s {η} then h {ηyp} s {η}.
Proof. Assume that h {η ∩ (y = p)} s {η} and let (K, µ) be a generalized state and ρ be a K-assignment such that
(K, µ)ρ  ηyp. We need to show that ([[s]](K, µ))ρ  η.
Let k = [[p]]ρ
(K,µ) and ρ1 = ρ yk . By Proposition 5.7, (K, µ)ρ1  η.
By definition, [[y]]ρ1
(K,µ) = k. By Proposition 5.7, [[p]]ρ1(K,µ) = [[pyp]]
ρ
(K,µ); since y does not occur in p, p
y
p is p
itself, hence [[p]]ρ1
(K,µ) = [[p]]ρ(K,µ) = k. Therefore, (K, µ)ρ1  (y = p).
Since h {η ∩ (y = p)} s {η}, it follows that ([[s]](K, µ))ρ1  η. Since ρ1 and ρ differ only in the value assigned
to y and y does not occur in η, also ([[s]](K, µ))ρ  η as required. 
We are ready to prove the soundness of Hoare calculus.
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Table 8
Preterms
pt(skip, p) = p
pt(bm← γ, p) = pbmγ
pt(xm← t, p) = pxmt
pt(toss(bm, r), p) = toss(bm, r; p)
pt(s1; s2, p) = pt(s1, pt(s2, p))
pt(if γ then s1 else s2, r) = r
pt(if γ then s1 else s2, y) = y
pt(if γ then s1 else s2, (
∫
γ0)) = (pt(s1, (
∫
γ0))/γ + pt(s2, (
∫
γ0))/(¬ γ ))
pt(if γ then s1 else s2, (p1 + p2)) = (pt(if γ then s1 else s2, p1)+ pt(if γ then s1 else s2, p2))
pt(if γ then s1 else s2, (p1 p2)) = (pt(if γ then s1 else s2, p1)× pt(if γ then s1 else s2, p2))
Theorem 5.9 (Soundness of Hoare Calculus). For any Hoare assertion Ψ , if ` Ψ then  Ψ .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of ` Ψ ; it suffices to show that each of the axioms
and inference rules is sound.
The soundness of axioms TAUT and SKIP and of the inference rules SEQ, AND, OR and CONS is
straightforward.
The soundness of axioms ASGR and ASGB follows from Lemma 5.2 and that of axiom TOSS from Lemma 5.3.
The soundness of the axiom
∫
FREE follows from Proposition 5.4, while Lemmas 5.6 and 5.8 establish the soundness
of inference rules IF and ELIMV respectively. 
6. Completeness and decidability of the Hoare calculus
We now show that the Hoare calculus provided in Section 4 is complete, i.e., if h Ψ then ` Ψ . Furthermore,
there is an algorithm that given a probabilistic Hoare formula Ψ determines whether h Ψ or 6h Ψ . The proof of
completeness and decidability of the Hoare logic uses the completeness and decidability of EPPL (see Theorem 2.2).
The proof of completeness of the Hoare logic employs the standard technique [10] of defining the weakest
precondition operator. Intuitively, the weakest precondition operator wp(·, ·) assigns to each statement s ∈ S and
each formula η ∈ PForms a new state formula wp(s, η) that corresponds to the weakest logical property that a state
must satisfy to ensure that η holds after execution of s. The weakest precondition itself uses the preterm operator.
Intuitively, the preterm operator pt(·, ·) assigns to each statement s ∈ S and each probabilistic term p ∈ PTerms a
new term pt(s, p) whose denotation in a given initial state is the same as the denotation of p after execution of s.
We then show that for any program s and EPPL formula η the Hoare calculus derives the judgment `
{wp(s, η)} s {η}, establishing by correctness (Theorem 5.9) that wp(s, η) is a sufficient precondition for s and η.
Furthermore, (K, µ)ρ  wp(s, η) iff [[s]](K, µ)ρ  η, implying that if h {η′} s {η} then  (η′ ⊃ wp(s, η)). The
completeness of EPPL will allow us to conclude that (η′ ⊃ wp(s, η)) is an EPPL theorem, and we can then use the
Hoare inference rule CONS to conclude that ` {η′} s {η}. The decidability of the Hoare calculus follows from the fact
that the weakest precondition can be computed algorithmically and decidability of EPPL.
6.1. Preterms
The preterm pt(s, p) is defined recursively on the structure of the statement s and the probability term p.
Recall that, given a memory cell bm, a constant r ∈ A and a probabilistic term p, the term toss(bm, r; p) is the
term obtained from p by replacing every occurrence of each measure term (
∫
γ ) by r˜(
∫
γ bmtt )+ (1− r˜ )(
∫
γ bmff ) and,
given a classical state formula γ and a probabilistic term p, the term (p/γ ) is the term obtained from p by replacing
every occurrence of each measure term (
∫
γ ′) by (
∫
(γ ′ ∧ γ )). The definition of pt(s, p) is shown in Table 8.
The preterm operator acts as the identity on the constants and the variables. Furthermore, the set of variables
occurring in the term is unchanged.
Proposition 6.1. For any statement s, the following hold:
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• pt(s, r) = r for all r ∈ A;
• pt(s, y) = y for all y ∈ Y;
• PVar(p) = PVar(pt(s, p)) for all probabilistic terms p.
Proof. By induction on the structure of s and p. 
Lemma 6.2. For any probabilistic term p, statement s, any generalized structure (K, µ) and K-assignment ρ,
[[pt(s, p)]]ρ
(K,µ) = [[p]]ρ[[s]](K,µ).
Proof. By induction on the structure of s. The case when s is skip follows from the definition. The cases when s is an
assignment to a memory cell or a probabilistic toss follow respectively from Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3.
If s is s1; s2, then applying the induction hypothesis twice to a given a probabilistic term p yields
[[pt(s1, pt(s2, p))]]ρ(K,µ) = [[pt(s2, p)]]ρ[[s1]](K,µ) = [[p]]
ρ
[[s1;s2]](K,µ)
as required.
If s is if γ then s1 else s2, we proceed by induction on p. The case when p is a constant r ∈ A is immediate from
the definition; the case when p is the variable y follows from the fact that the interpretation of a variable depends only
on the K-assignment ρ.
If p is the term (
∫
γ0) then by definition[[(∫
γ0
)]]ρ
[[s]](K,µ)
= κ1 + κ2
where
κ1 =
[[(∫
γ0
)]]ρ
[[s1]](K,µγ )
and κ2 =
[[(∫
γ0
)]]ρ
[[s2]](K,µ(¬ γ ))
.
Applying the induction hypothesis to s1 and s2 yields respectively
κ1 =
[[
pt
(
s1,
(∫
γ0
))]]ρ
(K,µγ )
and κ2 =
[[
pt
(
s2,
(∫
γ0
))]]ρ
(K,µ(¬ γ ))
.
By Proposition 5.5,
κ1 =
[[
pt
(
s1,
(∫
γ0
))]]ρ
(K,µγ )
=
[[
pt
(
s1,
(∫
γ0
))/
γ
]]ρ
(K,µ)
and
κ2 =
[[
pt
(
s2,
(∫
γ0
))]]ρ
(K,µ(¬ γ ))
=
[[
pt
(
s2,
(∫
γ0
))/
(¬ γ )
]]ρ
(K,µ)
;
the result now follows.
If p is (p1 + p2) or (p1 p2), then by induction hypothesis
[[pt(s, pi )]]ρ(K,µ) = [[pi ]]ρ[[s]](K,µ)
for i = 1, 2 and the result follows immediately. 
6.2. Weakest preconditions
The weakest precondition operator wp : S × PForms → PForms is defined using the preterm operator. The
weakest precondition wp(s, η) is obtained by replacing each comparison formula (p1 ≤ p2) occurring in wp(s, η) by
(pt(s, p1) ≤ pt(s, p2)). The formal definition can be found in Table 9.
It follows from the definition and Lemma 6.2 that wp(s, η) is indeed the weakest precondition for η to hold after
execution of s.
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Table 9
Weakest preconditions
wp(s, fff) = fff
wp(s, (p1 ≤ p2)) = (pt(s, p1) ≤ pt(s, p2))
wp(s, (η1 ⊃ η2)) = (wp(s, η1)⊃ wp(s, η2))
Theorem 6.3. For any statement s, probabilistic formula η, generalized structure (K, µ) and K-assignment ρ,
(K, µ)ρ h wp(s, η) iff ([[s]](K, µ))ρ h η.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of η. The base case where η is fff is immediate. The other base is
when η is (p1 ≤ p2); by Lemma 6.2,
[[pt(s, pi )]]ρ(K,µ) = [[pi ]]ρ[[s]](K,µ)
for i = 1, 2, and the result follows.
Finally, if η is (η1 ⊃ η2) then by induction hypothesis
(K, µ)ρ h wp(s, ηi ) iff ([[s]](K, µ))ρ h ηi
for i = 1, 2, and the result follows. 
The following corollary is straightforward.
Corollary 6.4. For any statement s and probabilistic formulas η and η′,
h {η′} s {η} iff  (η′ ⊃ wp(s, η)).
Proof. (⇒) Suppose h {η′} s {η}. Consider an arbitrary generalized probabilistic state (K, µ) and an arbitrary K-
assignment ρ such that (K, µ)ρ  η′; then ([[s]](K, µ))ρ  η, since h {η′} s {η}. By Theorem 6.3, (K, µ)ρ 
wp(s, η); since (K, µ) and ρ are arbitrary,  (η′ ⊃ wp(s, η)).
(⇐) Suppose  (η′ ⊃ wp(s, η)). Consider an arbitrary generalized probabilistic state (K, µ) and an arbitrary
K-assignment ρ such that (K, µ)ρ  η′. Then (K, µ)ρ  wp(s, η), since  (η′ ⊃ wp(s, η)); by Theorem 6.3,
([[s]](K, µ))ρ  η. Since (K, µ) and ρ are arbitrary, h {η′} s {η}. 
The next step is to show that the Hoare axiomatization allows us to derive the judgment
` {wp(s, η)} s {η}.
We start by showing the special case when η is y = p for some variable y ∈ Y and probabilistic term p.
Lemma 6.5. For any probabilistic term p, statement s and variable y ∈ Y,
` {y = pt(s, p)} s {y = p}.
Proof. By induction on the structure of s. If s is skip, an assignment to a memory cell or a probabilistic toss, then the
required judgment can be derived by axioms SKIP, ASGB, ASGR or TOSS.
If s is s1; s2, then pt(s1; s2, p) = pt(s1, pt(s2, p)) by definition, and the induction hypothesis applied to the
programs s1 and s2 gives
` {y = pt(s1, pt(s2, p))} s1 {y = pt(s2, p)}
and ` {y = pt(s2, p)} s2 {y = p} respectively. By SEQ it follows that
` {y = pt(s1; s2, p)} s1; s2 {y = p}.
If s is the alternative if γ then s1 else s2 we proceed by induction on p. If p is a constant or a variable, then
` {y = p} s {y = p} by axiom ∫ FREE and the result follows by observing that in these cases pt(s, p) = p by
Proposition 6.1.
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Suppose p is (
∫
γ0) for some classical state formula γ0 and pick two distinct variables y1, y2 ∈ Y different from y.
Let η1 be (y1 = pt(s1, (
∫
γ0))), η2 be (y2 = pt(s2, (
∫
γ0))) and ηĎ be
(y = y1 + y2) ∩
(
y1 = pt
(
s1,
(∫
γ0
))/
γ
)
∩
(
y2 = pt
(
s2,
(∫
γ0
))/
(¬ γ )
)
.
By the outer induction hypothesis (on s1 and s2),
`
{
yi = pt
(
si ,
(∫
γ0
))}
si
{
yi =
(∫
γ0
)}
for i = 1, 2. Since pt(s, p) = pt(s1, (
∫
γ0))/γ + pt(s2, (
∫
γ0))/(¬ γ ), we can derive {y = pt(s, p)} s {y = p} as
follows.
1. {y1 = pt(s1, (
∫
γ0))} s1 {y1 = (
∫
γ0)} Lemma
2. {y2 = pt(s2, (
∫
γ0))} s2 {y2 = (
∫
γ0)} Lemma
3. {η1gγ η2} if γ then s1 else s2 {y1 + y2 = (
∫
γ0)} IF 1,2
4. ηĎ ⊃ (η1gγ η2) TAUT
5. {ηĎ} if γ then s1 else s2 {y1 + y2 = (
∫
γ0)} CONS 3,4
6. {y = y1 + y2} if γ then s1 else s2 {y = y1 + y2}
∫
FREE
7. ηĎ ⊃ (y = y1 + y2) TAUT
8. {ηĎ} if γ then s1 else s2 {y = y1 + y2} CONS 6,7
9. {ηĎ} if γ then s1 else s2 {(y = y1 + y2) ∩ (y1 + y2 = (
∫
γ0))} AND 5,8
10. ((y = y1 + y2) ∩ (y1 + y2 = (
∫
γ0)))⊃ (y = (
∫
γ0))
∫
FREE
11. {ηĎ} if γ then s1 else s2 {y = (
∫
γ0)} CONS 9,10
12. {(y = y1 + pt(s2, (
∫
γ0))) ∩ (y1 = pt(s1, (
∫
γ0))/γ )}
if γ then s1 else s2 {y = (
∫
γ0)} ELIMV 11
13. {y = pt(s1, (
∫
γ0))/γ + pt(s2, (
∫
γ0))/(¬ γ )}
if γ then s1 else s2 {y = (
∫
γ0)} ELIMV12
If p is (p1 + p2), pick y1, y2 ∈ Y different from y such that y1 and y2 do not occur in either p1 or p2. Let ηĎ be
(y = y1 + y2) ∩ (y1 = p1) ∩ (y2 = p2)
and define ηĚ as
(y = y1 + y2) ∩ (y1 = pt(s, p1)) ∩ (y2 = pt(s, p2)).
By the inner induction hypothesis (in y1 and y2), ` {yi = pt(s, pi )} s {yi = pi } for i = 1, 2. Then the judgment
{y = pt(s, p)} s {y = p} can be derived as follows.
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1. {y1 = pt(s, p1)} s {y1 = p1} Lemma
2. ηĚ ⊃ (y1 = pt(s, p1)) TAUT
3. {ηĚ} s {y1 = p1} CONS 1,2
4. {y2 = pt(s, p2)} s {y2 = p2} Lemma
5. ηĚ ⊃ (y2 = pt(s, p2)) TAUT
6. {ηĚ} s {y2 = p2} CONS 4,5
7. {ηĚ} s {(y1 = p1) ∩ (y2 = p2)} AND 3,6
8. {y = y1 + y2} s {y = y1 + y2}
∫
FREE
9. ηĚ ⊃ (y = y1 + y2) TAUT
10. {ηĚ} s {y = y1 + y2} CONS 8,9
11. {ηĚ} s {ηĎ} AND 7,10
12. ηĎ ⊃ (y = (p1 + p2))
∫
FREE
13. {ηĚ} s {y = (p1 + p2)} CONS 11,12
14. {(y = y1 + pt(s, p2)) ∩ (y1 = pt(s, p1))} s {y = (p1 + p2)} ELIMV 13
15. {y = pt(s, p1)+ pt(s, p2)} s {y = (p1 + p2)} ELIMV 14
The case where p is (p1 p2) is similar. 
We are now ready to show that the judgment {wp(s, η)} s {η} is derivable in the Hoare logic for any η. Given a
probabilistic formula η and a probabilistic term p we say that p occurs as a comparison term in η if there is some
probabilistic term q such that either the comparison formula (p ≤ q) or the comparison formula (q ≤ p) occurs in η.
Theorem 6.6. For any statement s and any conditional free formula η,
` {wp(s, η)} s {η}.
Proof. Let p1, p2, . . . , pn be all the comparison terms occurring in η. Pick n distinct variables y1, y2, . . . , yn ∈ Y
that do not occur in η. Let p′1, p′2, . . . , p′n be the terms pt(s, p1),pt(s, p2), . . . ,pt(s, pn) respectively and let ηĎ be
the formula obtained from η by replacing each occurrence of a comparison formula (pi ≤ p j ) by (yi ≤ y j ). Finally,
take
ηa ≡ ηĎ ∩
(⋂
i
(yi = pi )
)
and ηb ≡ ηĎ ∩
(⋂
i
(yi = p′i )
)
.
Clearly, the following hold:
• ηĎ is an analytical formula;
• ηĎy1y2...ynp1 p2...pn is η;
• (ηa ⊃ ηĎ) and (ηb ⊃ ηĎ) are EPPL theorems;
• (ηb ⊃ (yi = p′i )) are EPPL theorems for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• wp(s, η) is ηĎy1y2...ynp′1 p′2...p′n .
By axiom
∫
FREE, ` {ηĎ} s {ηĎ}; by Lemma 6.5, ` {yi = p′i } s {yi = pi } for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since (ηb ⊃ ηĎ) and
(ηb ⊃ (yi = p′i )) are EPPL theorems for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by application of CONS it follows that
` {ηb} s {ηĎ} and ` {ηb} s {yi = pi }
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for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Several applications of the inference rule AND then give ` {ηb} s {ηa}; since (ηa ⊃ η) is an EPPL
theorem, another application of CONS yields ` {ηb} s {η}. Finally, several applications of ELIMV show that
`
{
ηĎ
y1y2...yn
p′1 p′2...p′n
}
s {η}
as required. 
We are ready to show the Hoare calculus is complete and decidable.
Theorem 6.7 (Completeness and Decidability). Let s be a probabilistic sequential program and η be an EPPL
formula. If h {η′} s {η}, then ` {η′} s {η}. Moreover, the set of theorems of the Hoare calculus is recursive.
Proof.
Completeness. Suppose that h {η′} s {η}. By Corollary 6.4,  (η′ ⊃ wp(s, η)). By completeness of EPPL, `
(η′ ⊃ wp(s, η)). Theorem 6.6 implies that ` {wp(s, η)} s {η}, whence ` {η′} s {η} by CONS.
Decidability. By soundness and completeness, ` {η′} s {η} iff h {η′} s {η}. By Corollary 6.4 and completeness of
EPPL, it follows that ` {η′} s {η} iff ` (η′ ⊃ wp(s, η)). The decidability is now a consequence of the decidability of
EPPL and the fact that wp(s, η) can be computed algorithmically. 
The complexity of the formulawp(s, η) is exponential on the number of nested if–then–else commands containing
terms denoting probabilities of formulas, as seen in Table 8. Furthermore, EPPL is double exponential in the number
of propositional symbols and exponential in the number of variables, as discussed at the end of Section 2.
7. Examples
We now present two examples and compute the weakest pre-condition of two programs.
One-time pad. A one-time pad is a provably secure way of encrypting a bit-string. Given a plain-text message m and
a key k of the same length, the cipher-text c is computed as the bitwise xor of m and k, where k is a key that will be
used only once.
We model this via the following program Senc, which generates a random 1-bit key bmk and encrypts the 1-bit
plain-text bmp.4
toss
(
bmk,
1
2
)
;
bmc←¬(bmk ⇔ bmp)
The security of this one-time pad is equivalent to requiring that the probability of the cipher-text xmc be tt be 12
regardless of the probability distribution on the possible values of the plain-text xmp. This can be expressed by the
following Hoare assertion:
Ψ ≡
{(∫
tt
)
= 1
}
Senc
{(∫
bmc
)
= 1
2
}
.
The pre-condition (
∫
tt) = 1 means that the total measure of the space of valuations is 1. Although Ψ is derivable
in our Hoare calculus, as shown in [8], we shall show that there exists a derivation not by building one directly, but
simply by computing weakest preconditions and applying the above results.
By definition,(
wp
(
Senc,
(∫
bmc
)
= 1
2
))
≡
(
pt
(
Senc,
(∫
bmc
))
= pt
(
Senc,
1
2
))
.
4 Observe that ¬(bmk ⇔ bmp) is a way of computing (bmk xor bmp).
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Now, pt(Senc, 12 ) is
1
2 by Proposition 6.1. On the other hand,
pt
(
Senc,
(∫
bmc
))
= pt
(
toss
(
bmk,
1
2
)
, pt
(
bmc←¬(bmk ⇔ bmp),
(∫
bmc
)))
= pt
(
toss
(
bmk,
1
2
)
,
(∫
¬(bmk ⇔ bmp)
))
= 1˜
2
(∫
¬(bmk ⇔ tt)
)
+
(
1− 1˜
2
)(∫
¬(bmk ⇔ ff)
)
.
Hence,(
wp
(
Senc,
(∫
bmc
)
= 1
2
))
≡
(
1˜
2
(∫
¬(bmk ⇔ tt)
)
+
(
1− 1˜
2
)(∫
¬(bmk ⇔ ff)
)
= 1
2
)
.
The derivability of Ψ now follows from the fact that((∫
tt
)
= 1
)
≈
(
1˜
2
(∫
¬(bmk ⇔ tt)
)
+
(
1− 1˜
2
)(∫
¬(bmk ⇔ ff)
)
= 1
2
)
is an EPPL theorem, since both sides of the equivalence are clearly equivalent to (
∫
(bmk ⇔ ff))+ (
∫
(bmk ⇔ tt)) = 1.
Quantum one-time pad.We now present a quantum variation of the previous example. A qubit is the basic memory
unit in quantum computation, just as a bit is the basic memory unit in classical computation. The state of a qubit is a
pair (α, β) of complex numbers such that |α|2+|β|2 = 1. A quantum one-time pad [2] encrypts a qubit using two key
(classical) bits in a secure way: observing the encrypted qubit yields two results, both with equal probability. In the
special case that α and β are real numbers, a one-bit key bmk suffices; we restrict our attention to this special case.
If the key bmk is 1, then the qubit is (unitarily) encrypted as the pair (β,−α), otherwise it remains the same. The
following program Sqenc simulates this process by first generating a random key and then encrypting the qubit in
state (xm1, xm2).
toss
(
bmk,
1
2
)
; if bmk then PauliX Z else skip
Here, PauliX Z is xm3← xm1; xm1← xm2; xm2←−xm3; the name PauliX Z has its roots in quantum mechanics.
Assume that the initial values of xm1 and xm2 are c1 and c2 respectively, with c1 6= c2. It follows from quantum
information theory that the quantum one-time pad is secure if the probability of xm1 being c1 after encryption is 12
(and hence that of xm1 being c2 is also 12 ). Assuming ηI is ((xm1 = c1) ∧ (xm2 = c2) ∧ (c1 < c2)), this can be
expressed by the following Hoare assertion.
Ψ ≡
{((∫
tt
)
= 1
)
∩ ηI
}
Sqenc
{(∫
(xm1 = c1)
)
= 1
2
}
.
This Hoare assertion can be shown to hold by the method of weakest preconditions.
By definition of preterm,
pt
(
PauliX Z ,
(∫
(xm1 = c1)
))
is
(∫
(xm2 = c1)
)
pt
(
skip,
(∫
(xm1 = c1)
))
is
(∫
(xm1 = c1
)
.
Hence,
pt
(
if bmk then PauliX Z else skip,
(∫
(xm1 = c1)
))
=
(∫
((xm2 = c1) ∧ bmk)
)
+
(∫
((xm1 = c1) ∧ ¬bmk)
)
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Therefore,
pt
(
Sqenc,
(∫
(xm1 = c1)
))
=
((
1˜
2
(∫
((xm2 = c1) ∧ tt)
)
+
(
1− 1˜
2
)(∫
((xm2 = c1) ∧ ff)
))
+
(
1˜
2
(∫
((xm1 = c1) ∧ ¬ tt)
)
+
(
1− 1˜
2
)(∫
((xm1 = c1) ∧ ¬ ff)
)))
.
Also, pt(Sqenc, 12 ) is
1
2 by Proposition 6.1. The Hoare assertion Ψ now follows from the fact that(((∫
tt
)
= 1
)
∩ ηI
)
⊃
(
pt
(
Sqenc,
(∫
(xm1 = c1)
))
= 1
2
)
is an EPPL theorem.
8. Related work
The area of formal methods in probabilistic programs has attracted a lot of work ranging from logic-based
reasoning [13,21,31,14,17,25,27,10] to semantics [20,19,33,26].
This work is in the field of probabilistic dynamic logics. Dynamic logic is a modal logic in which the modalities
are of the form 〈s〉ϕ, where s is a program and ϕ is a state assertion formula. For probabilistic programs, there are
two distinct approaches to dynamic logic. The main difference in the two approaches is that one uses truth-functional
state logic while the other one uses state logic with arithmetical connectives.
The first works based on truth-functional probabilistic state logic appeared in the context of dynamic logic [32,22,
30,13,12]. In the context of probabilistic truth-functional dynamic logics, the state language has terms representing
probabilities (e.g., (
∫
γ ) represents the probability of γ being true). An infinitary complete axiom system for
probabilistic dynamic logic is given in [22]. Later, a complete finitary axiomatization of probabilistic dynamic
logic was given in [13]. However, the state logic is second-order (to deal with iteration) and undecidable. In [12],
decidability of a less expressive dynamic logic is achieved.
Hoare logic can be viewed as a fragment of dynamic logic, and the first probabilistic Hoare logic with truth-
functional propositional state logic appears in [31]. However, as discussed in Section 1, even simple assertions in this
logic may not be provable. For instance, the valid Hoare assertion (adapting somewhat the syntax){(∫
tt
)
= 1
}
if x = 0 then skip else skip
{(∫
tt
)
= 1
}
is not provable in the logic. As noted in [31,21], the reason for incompleteness is the Hoare rule for the alternative
if–then–else, which tries to combine absolute information of the two alternatives truth-functionally. The Hoare logic
in [10] circumvents the problem of the alternative by defining the probabilistic sum connective as already discussed
in Section 1. Although this logic is more expressive than the one in [31] and completeness is achieved for a fragment
of the Hoare logic, it is not clear how to axiomatize the test construct and the probabilistic sum connective [10].
The other approach to dynamic logic uses arithmetical state logic instead of truth-functional state logic [21,19,
18,25]. For example, instead of the if–then–else construct, the programming language in [21] has the construct
γ ?s1 + (¬ γ )?s2 which is closely bound to the forward denotational semantics proposed in [20]. This leads to
a probabilistic dynamic logic in which measurable functions are used as state formulas and the connectives are
interpreted as arithmetical operations.
In the context of Hoare logics, the approach of arithmetical connectives is the one that has attracted more research.
The Hoare triple in this context naturally leads to the definition of weakest pre-condition for a measurable function g
and a program s: the weakest pre-condition wp(g, s) is the function that has the greatest expected value amongst all
functions f such that { f } s {g} is a valid Hoare triple. The weakest pre-condition can thus be thought of as a backward
semantics which transforms a post-state g in the context of a program s to a pre-state wp(g, s). The important result
in this area is the duality between the forward semantics and the backwards semantics [18].
Later, [25] extended this framework to address non-determinism and proved the duality between forward semantics
and backward semantics. Instead of just using functions f and g as pre-conditions and post-conditions, [25] also
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allows a rudimentary state language with basic classical state formulas α, negation, disjunction and conjunction. The
classical state formula α is interpreted as the function that takes the value 1 in the memory valuations where α is true
and 0 otherwise. Conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as minimum and maximum, respectively, and negation
as subtraction from the constant function 1. For example, the following Hoare assertion is valid in this logic.
{r} toss(bm, r) {bm}
In the pre-condition, r is the constant function r , and bm is the function that takes value 1 when bm is true and 0
otherwise. The above Hoare assertion states that the probability of bm being true after the probabilistic toss is at
least r . The Hoare rule for probabilistic tosses in the context of arithmetical Hoare logics takes the form
wp(toss(bm, r), α) = r × wp(bm← tt, α)+ (1− r)× wp(bm← ff, α).
The problem of the alternative of the if–then–else construct is tackled in [8] by marking the choices at the end of
the execution. However, our proof of completeness shows that this is not needed and variables in the state logic are
sufficient to account for individual contributions to the measure terms (
∫
γ ).
Our state logic itself is the probabilistic logic in [11] extended with variables that aid in the proof of completeness
of the Hoare logic. The logic is designed by the exogenous semantics approach to probabilistic logics [28,29,11,1,24].
A second difference is that we also allow products in terms. The probability logic in [11] does not have general
product terms and allows only products with constants. The constants are rational numbers and this makes the logic
NP-complete. We can also keep this restriction in our state assertion language.
The main distinction between the state logic herein and the logic in [8] is that we do not distinguish between
possibility and probability. The semantic structure in [24] also contains a set of possible valuations along with a
probability measure with the restriction that impossible valuations are improbable. The formula γ is an atomic
formula of the state logic in [8] and is true of a semantic structure if γ holds for all possible valuations. The
conditional formula η/γ also appears as an atomic formula in [8]. It was then shown as a lemma that the conditional
construct could be removed from the language without loss of expressivity (in other words, for each formula η there
was a provably equivalent conditional-free formula η′). However, as we do not distinguish between probability and
possibility, the conditional construct can be easily defined by recursion and is hence removed from the primitives of
the state language.
9. Concluding remarks
Our main contribution is a complete and decidable probabilistic Hoare calculus with a truth-functional state
assertion logic that enjoys recursive axiomatization.
The truth-functional state assertion logic is essentially the probability logic in [11] extended with variables that aid
in the proof of the completeness of the Hoare logic. For the sake of convenience, we also assumed that the measures
take values from an arbitrary real closed field instead of the set of real numbers. The first-order theory of real closed
fields is complete for real numbers [16,4] and hence the results in this paper will still hold if we work only with real
numbers.
The proof of completeness of the Hoare logic employs the standard technique of defining weakest preconditions.
The algorithmic definition of weakest preconditions uses an auxiliary preterm operator. The decidability of the Hoare
logic then follows from the decidability of the state logic.
There are several directions in which this work can be extended. First, the complexity analysis of both the state
logic and Hoare logic needs to be carried out. This will entail the complexity analysis of the first-order theory of
real closed fields.5 We also plan to include the iteration construct and demonic non-determinism in future work. For
iteration, we will investigate completeness using an oracle for arithmetical reasoning.
Our long-term interests are in reasoning about quantum programs and protocols. Probabilities are inevitable in
quantum programs because measurements of quantum states yield probabilistic mixtures of quantum states. We
5 Some earlier results [5] claimed that the complexity of the decision procedure of satisfiability of first-order theory of real closed fields is
PSPACE complete. However, in personal communication, Michael Ben-Or (one of the authors of [5]) informed us that the proof of this result has
been called into question.
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aim to investigate Hoare-style reasoning and dynamic logics for quantum programming. Towards this end, we have
already designed logics for reasoning about individual quantum states [23,9], a sound Hoare logic for basic quantum
imperative programs [7] and a sound quantum temporal logic [3].
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